The Rice Seedling Sutra by Yeshe Thabkhe

Author:Yeshe Thabkhe
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Wisdom Publications

HOW A CHARIOT EXISTS CONVENTIONALLY

These undeceived cognitions engage their objects according to how they appear and are upheld in the conventions of the world. They engage their object, such as a chariot, without analyzing its ontological status, without dissatisfaction regarding that. Therefore they are called “cognitions that engage without analysis or investigation,” “cognitions of worldly conventions,” and “what is upheld by the world.” Their objects, phenomena such as chariots, are said to exist “by the power of convention,” “by mere conceptual imputation,” and “by the power of conceptualization.”

Question: Can you posit as existent whatever is upheld by the world and whatever is imputed by concept?

Answer: No, it is not like that. Although something may be upheld by the world, if it is undermined by reasoning, it is not suitable to be posited as existing even conventionally. For example, in the world one finds the apprehension of a self that is established by its essential nature and the apprehension of what belongs to that self. Also there is the apprehension of a prior mountain being the mountain of the present. Therefore, although these are upheld by the world, they do not exist in that way.

Question: What is the meaning of existing conventionally or not existing conventionally?

Answer: Je Tsongkhapa states in his Great Treatise:

How does one determine whether something exists conventionally? We hold that something exists conventionally (1) if it is known to a conventional consciousness, (2) if no other conventional valid cognition contradicts its being as it is thus known, and (3) if reason that accurately analyzes reality — that is, analyzes whether something intrinsically exists — does not contradict it. We hold that what fails to meet those criteria does not exist.114

Question: Above you declared as your foundation the words of Je Tsongkhapa — his Great Treatise’s section on insight — and then said that you will explain the existence of phenomena that are the products of dependent arising as able to perform their individual functions.115 However, what you are explaining here is only citations of statements from the master Candrakīrti’s Clear Words, his commentary on the Four Hundred Stanzas, and so forth. One does not see any explanation of any stages of the path texts. Why did you not explain any of Tsongkhapa’s unique assertions?

Answer: What you say is true. Je Tsongkhapa specially selected some important points that exist in the words of the master Nāgārjuna and his disciples that did not catch the attention of many great scholars, and he explained these points. In doing so, he neither created any new terminology for the conventions in the treatises of those masters nor changed the meaning of their words.

What especially stands out in the minds of those who analyze this clearly? These phenomena — pitchers and so on — are empty of being established from their own side or of being ultimately established. However, conventionally you posit their existence, which is established by valid cognition as being able to perform their individual functions. Those who single-mindedly think that these

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